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ARTICLE 
CORPORATE LAW DOCTRINE AND THE LEGACY OF 
AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM  
EDWARD B. ROCK† 
In this contribution to a symposium on “Legal Realism and Legal Doctrine,” I 
examine the role that jurisprudence plays in corporate law doctrine. Through an 
examination of paired cases from the United States and United Kingdom, I offer a 
case study of the contrasting influence on corporate law judging of American Legal 
Realism versus traditional U.K. Doctrinalism.  
Specialist judges in both systems, aided by specialist lawyers, clearly identify and 
understand the core policy issues involved in a dispute and arrive at sensible results. 
Adjusting for differences in background law and institutions, it seems likely that the 
disputes would ultimately be resolved in more or less the same way in each system. 
This is unsurprising in a field such as corporate law, where market and institutional 
pressures demand practical solutions to practical problems. 
On the other hand, the differences in style are inescapable. While Delaware 
corporate law judges openly identify gaps and resolve them by reference to policy, 
U.K. judges employ a traditional historical/doctrinal approach, working through 
precedent and, in doing so, developing principles to resolve the case at bar. These 
differences in style, it seems to me, are a legacy of the impact of American Legal 
Realism on legal education in the United States, in contrast to the more traditional 
approach dominant in the United Kingdom. Explicit policy analysis is far more 
acceptable and natural in the Delaware approach than in the United Kingdom, and 
this difference in legal culture has effects on how lawyers present cases. 
 
 
 
                                                            
† Saul A. Fox Distinguished Professor of Business Law, University of Pennsylvania Law 
School. Thanks to Joshua Getzler, Brian Leiter, Leo Strine, and participants in this Symposium 
for helpful comments. 
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INTRODUCTION 
American Legal Realism (ALR) has penetrated American legal thinking 
so deeply that nearly every lawyer, judge, or legal academic educated in an 
American law school began to absorb its core lessons from the time he or 
she started studying law. At the same time, as corporate lawyers, judges, and 
corporate law academics, we spend much of our time discussing, describing, 
and contesting corporate law doctrine. Should the persistence of doctrine be 
surprising to a Legal Realist? Does a Legal Realist approach legal doctrine 
differently from a legal formalist? What role does corporate law doctrine 
play in a corporate law system populated by actors educated in the Legal 
Realist tradition?  
I. THE LEGACY OF AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 
In law schools, we spend little time talking with our students or with 
each other about the fundamental jurisprudential commitments that form 
the foundation of our views of law. Although law schools offer courses in 
Jurisprudence or Legal Philosophy, these courses are not mandatory, and 
most law students graduate without receiving any systematic overview of 
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these subjects. But there are core jurisprudential commitments that form 
the foundation of American legal education and that distinguish it from 
legal education in other countries. I submit that most of us who were 
educated in American law schools came away with some version of the 
following understandings of law.  
First, American lawyers, to one degree or another, all subscribe to the 
notion that in many litigated cases—especially those that get to the Courts 
of Appeals and form the foundation of our casebooks—traditional legal 
materials (i.e., statutes and case law) rarely suffice to determine the 
outcome. We identify a gap between those materials and a case’s result that 
is not filled by logical deduction, regardless of how a court ultimately 
explains the outcome. In nearly all interesting cases, we teach and believe 
that there is enough slack that a court can come out either way. In 
casebooks, cases with similar fact patterns but different outcomes are often 
paired. We typically teach these cases as illustrations of the manipulability 
of doctrine, rather than as opportunities for fine-grained distinctions.1 
Second, when we identify these gaps, we teach that judges make new 
law—not discover law that was somehow already there—and ask our 
students to articulate the “policy” considerations that explain the result or 
could motivate a different result.  
For purposes of this Article, assume that, as a descriptive matter, I am 
more or less right in this characterization of American legal education. 
Where do these ideas come from and what implications do they have for the 
role of corporate law doctrine?  
II. THE CORE OF AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM: THE 
“UNDERDETERMINATION” THESIS  
AND THE ROLE OF FACTS 
In an extremely valuable reconstruction that I rely on heavily here, 
Brian Leiter distinguishes several strands that broadly characterize the fairly 
heterogeneous group of scholars who can be labeled American Legal 
Realists: Karl Llewellyn, Underhill Moore, Walter Wheeler Cook, Herman 
                                                            
1 For example, in introducing the goals of damages in U.S. contracts courses, Peevyhouse v. 
Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962), which held that the proper measure of 
damages is the cost of remedying the defect, is paired with Groves v. John Wunder Co., 286 N.W. 
235 (Minn. 1939), which held that the proper measure of damages is the difference in value of the 
property before and after the defective performance. See JOHN P. DAWSON, WILLIAM 
BURNETT HARVEY & STANLEY D. HENDERSON, CONTRACTS: CASES AND COMMENT 11-
19 (7th ed. 1998) (juxtaposing Peevyhouse and Groves as examples of damages calculation in contract 
law).  
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Oliphant, Leon Green, Jerome Frank, Thurman Arnold, Felix Cohen, Max 
Radin, and others.2  
First, all Realists agree that the traditional style of judicial opinions 
provides an inaccurate description of the actual process of adjudication 
when it expresses the conclusion as the result of a sort of syllogism in which 
the major premise is “the law,” the minor premise is “the facts,” and the 
conclusion follows with logical certainty.3 This view is sometimes ridiculed 
as “mechanical jurisprudence.”4 
Second, all Realists agree that traditional legal materials underdetermine 
the outcome in two related senses.5 As Leiter explains, the law is “rationally 
indeterminate” in that the available legal reasons drawn from statutes and 
cases do not justify a unique decision in a significant number of cases.6 In 
addition, the law is “causally or explanatorily indeterminate” in that legal 
reasons do not suffice to explain why a judge decided as he or she did.7 
In justifying the indeterminacy thesis, Realists go beyond the lawyers’ 
sense of uncertainty and identify a particular source of uncertainty in legal 
decisionmaking: conflicting but plausibly applicable lines of precedent and 
tools that allow a judge to legitimately choose either outcome.8 Karl 
Llewellyn’s famous article on canons of statutory construction is a 
paradigmatic example of this approach.9 
The idea that there are situations in which the law “runs out” and judges 
make law “interstitially” is not unique to Realism.10 H.L.A. Hart, who 
                                                            
2 See Brian Leiter, American Legal Realism (providing an overview of the theoretical 
approaches to ALR), in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL 
THEORY 50, 50-66 (Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., 2005). In this Article, I 
will use “American Legal Realist,” “Legal Realist,” and “Realist” more or less interchangeably. 
3 See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 103 (1930) (“[Y]ou will study 
these opinions in vain to discover anything remotely resembling a statement of the actual judging 
process.”). 
4 See, e.g., Leiter, supra note 2, at 50 (explaining that early scholars of ALR reacted to the 
“mechanical jurisprudence” of their time). 
5 Id. at 52-53. 
6 Id. at 51. 
7 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
8 See id. at 51-52 (interpreting precedent in different ways can lead to different outcomes, 
which reduces its value as a source of law). 
9 See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons 
About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1950) (identifying strains of 
law in the canon of statutory interpretation allowing contradictory, but equally legitimate, 
interpretations of statutes); see also Leiter, supra note 2, at 51 (“[I]f a court could properly appeal to 
either canon when faced with a question of statutory interpretation, then the ‘methods’ of legal 
reasoning . . . would justify at least two different interpretations of the meaning of the statue.”). 
10 See Leiter, supra note 2, at 61-65 (reviewing how the “legal process” school of legal theory 
began as a response to ALR and adopted many of its assumptions).  
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argued strongly against Realism’s “rule skepticism,” acknowledged that 
judges can and must make law.11 What separates the Realists from Hart12—
indeed, what separates the implicit jurisprudence of American legal 
education from the prevailing view in the United Kingdom and the rest of 
the world—is (a) a sense of how often the law runs out and (b) how gaps are 
and should be filled.  
Hart argued that the Realists overstated the extent of indeterminacy and 
misconceived how judges fill gaps. In cases not addressed by the relevant 
statute, Hart argued that the judicial role is fundamentally different from 
the legislative role: “[N]ot only are the judge’s powers subject to many 
constraints narrowing his choice from which a legislature may be quite free, 
but since the judge’s powers are exercised only to dispose of particular 
instant cases he cannot use these to introduce large-scale reforms or new 
codes.”13  
Rather, for Hart, the judge’s role as an interstitial lawmaker is best 
analogized to the “delegated rulemaking power [of] an administrative 
body.”14 In this model, courts have authority to make rules for unregulated 
cases and are instructed to do so with reference to the principles and 
standards established in the authoritative provisions.15 Hart further argued 
that “legal decisionmaking does not proceed in vacuo but always against a 
background of a system of relatively well established rules, principles, 
standards, and values.”16  
The Realists had a very different view. Mainstream Realists, including 
Llewellyn, Oliphant, Green, and others, thought that the gap was filled by 
some combination of “fact-scenarios” and industry practice.17 Thus, in 
understanding tort law, Leon Green argued that traditional tort law—with 
its doctrinal categories including negligence, intentional torts, and strict 
liability—was misleading and should instead be thought of as organized by 
factual scenarios such as “surgical operations,” and “traffic and 
                                                            
11 H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 132-44 (2d ed. 1994). One of the key 
differences between Hart’s and Ronald Dworkin’s views is whether judges make law interstitially. 
Dworkin famously argued against Hart that even in “hard cases,” there is one right answer which 
judges must try to reach, even if we may not know whether they have succeeded in doing so. 
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 109 (1986). 
12 Here, I take Hart to be a very articulate spokesman for British legal culture. 
13 HART, supra note 11, at 273. 
14 Id. at 132. 
15 Id. 
16 H.L.A. Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble 
Dream, 11 GA. L. REV. 969, 979 (1977). 
17 See Leiter, supra note 2, at 54-55 (explaining that in Oliphant’s example of the conflicting 
court decisions on the validity of contractual promises not to compete, the courts enforced the 
prevailing norms as expressed in guild regulations for a particular fact-scenario). 
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transportation.”18 Similarly, Oliphant, in his reconstruction of the law of 
contractual promises not to compete, claimed that the decisions could be 
understood only by reference to the factual circumstances of the cases: an 
employee’s promise to an employer (often invalid) versus a business seller’s 
promise not to compete with the buyer (often valid).19 For Realists such as 
Llewellyn, Green, Oliphant, and others in the group Leiter refers to as the 
“Sociological Wing,” the law cannot be understood without attention to the 
underlying and determinative factual and industry details.20 These are the 
“materials” that were thought necessary to supplement the cases and 
statutes in our typical “Cases and Materials on the Law of X.” 
For these Realists, “what judges decide on the facts in such cases falls 
into one of two patterns[:] either (1) judges enforce the norms of the 
prevailing commercial culture; or (2) they try to reach the decision that is 
socioeconomically best under the circumstances.”21 This latter category is 
the domain of “policy.”  
This vision differs from Hart’s and points judges in a very different 
direction. In Hart’s view, the role of the judge, as delegated decisionmaker, 
is to dig deeply into the cases and statutes to identify the core principles—
the ratio decidendi—and then to redescribe them at a level of generality 
sufficient to resolve the new case.22 A delegated decisionmaker must strive 
to discern the principles according to which he or she is expected to decide. 
By contrast, the Realists, in focusing on how judges actually decide 
cases, did not have a single view of how judges should decide them. Leiter 
argued that “[s]ome Realists (Holmes, Felix Cohen, Frank on the bench) 
think judges should simply adopt, openly, a legislative role, acknowledging 
that, because the law is indeterminate, courts must necessarily make 
judgments on matters of social and economic policy.”23 For the Sociological 
Realists, the judge should look outside legal materials to determine the 
                                                            
18 Id. at 55.  
19 See id. at 54-55 (quoting Oliphant’s analysis of cases involving promises not to compete). 
20 See id. at 55 (providing that the thesis of Sociological Wing Realists like Llewellyn, Oliphant, 
and Moore posits that “judges enforce the norms of commercial culture or try to do what is 
socioeconomically best on the facts of the case”). 
21 BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL 
REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 27 (2007). 
22 Hart, supra note 16, at 980 (extolling Lord Atkin’s analysis in the early products liability 
case Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562 (H.L.) 564 (appeal taken from Scot.)). 
23 Leiter, supra note 2, at 58. Others, according to Leiter, largely ignore the normative 
question on the grounds that how judges decide cases is just a fact about what they do and it would 
be “idle to tell judges they ought to do otherwise.” Id. 
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prevailing commercial norms or, in the absence of such norms, the socially 
or economically preferred outcome.24  
Both approaches, from Hart’s perspective, go well beyond the delegated 
rulemaking authority given to judges and usurp the role of the legislature.25 
III. THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES EXTENSION:                                       
A BRIEF DIGRESSION 
Many American lawyers, judges, and academics were exposed to Critical 
Legal Studies (CLS) in law school. How does CLS relate to the ALR of the 
1930s? At the risk of dramatically oversimplifying a varied group of scholars, 
the connections are more or less the following. ALR convincingly 
demonstrated that the gap between traditional legal materials and judicial 
decisions is a persistent feature of adjudication.26 As noted above, the mainstream 
Realists thought the gap could largely be filled by what are now viewed as 
accepted supplements, such as industry practice, or have already been 
incorporated into the traditional legal materials through law reform efforts 
that pay more attention to fact-scenarios, such as the Restatements. More 
generally, ALR argued that the gaps are filled by considerations of policy.  
CLS picked up on this gap, viewed it as pervasive, and argued that 
(a) judicial opinions never convince us that the result was legally compelled 
and (b) adjudication is irredeemably ideological.27 The above overview of 
ALR allows one to trace the connections and the divergences. The gap—the 
observation that, at least for the “interesting” cases, a judge could come out 
either way—becomes a pervasive “contradiction” in the law.28 If one can 
come out either way, then the rhetorical claim of logical inevitability that 
characterizes much judicial prose is shown to be false.29 If the gap is filled 
by reference to considerations of policy, then we can interrogate those 
                                                            
24 These Realists were later joined by Judge Posner in arguing that judges should step out 
from behind legal doctrine and directly engage with political and economic considerations weighed 
by legislatures. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 121 (2013) (arguing 
that when the legislative purpose is not discernible, “the judge is the legislator and has to base 
[the] decision on his conception of sound public policy within the limits the legislators have set 
. . . [and] must, like other legislators, consider among other things the likely consequences of a 
decision one way or the other”). 
25 Hart does recognize that in the small set of cases where searching the law for applicable 
principles yields no answer, it is appropriate to decide as a conscientious legislator would. See 
HART, supra note 11, at 273 (“[T]here will be points where the existing law fails to dictate any 
decision as the correct one, and to decide [these cases] . . . the judge must exercise his lawmaking 
powers.”).  
26 See discussion supra Part II. 
27 DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION 82-92 (1998). 
28 Id. at 83-92, 284-85.  
29 Id. at 86-89. 
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considerations. As soon as we ask “who benefits?”, a case can often be made 
that entrenched interests benefit. In this way, policy considerations, far from 
being neutral or technocratic, are seen as a Trojan horse for ideology.30  
Because CLS has not, to my eyes, had anywhere near the impact on the 
culture of legal education or legal thinking as ALR, I will focus my 
attention here exclusively on ALR.  
IV. AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND DOCTRINE 
ALR has always had a complex relationship with legal doctrine. In many 
respects, doctrine was the principal focus of the Realist project. In its worst 
incarnation, legal doctrine, as wielded by the exaggerated figure of the 
“formalist,” is the disingenuous, ex post rationalization that obscures the 
degree of judgment involved in adjudication.31 For Realists, the frequent 
rhetorical claim that legal doctrine “compels” an outcome should never be 
taken at face value.32 
Legal doctrine can also be misleading when other factors are the 
principal determinants of adjudication. In Oliphant’s analysis of the 
enforceability of promises not to compete, the principal determinant turns 
out to be whether the promise was made by an employee to an employer 
(presumptively invalid) or by a business seller to a buyer (presumptively 
valid).33 The then-governing doctrine misled by failing to identify these as 
critical factors.34 
This critique led to a view of doctrine as a solution to uncertainty, and 
explains the Realists’ central role in law reform efforts such as the American 
Law Institute’s (ALI) Restatements and the development of the Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC). For example, by modifying legal doctrine 
regulating contractual promises not to compete to track relevant fact-
scenarios, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 188 incorporated 
                                                            
30 Id. at 86, 97-130. 
31 See, e.g., FRANK, supra note 3, at 22-41 (discussing the language of law that allows 
rationalization of seemingly incompatible outcomes in legal decisionmaking and the role of judges 
in making laws). 
32 Id. at 32-40 (arguing that the “basic legal myth . . . that the law can be entirely 
predictable” stems from a “childish desire” to have a world free from “chance and error due to 
human fallibility”). 
33 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.  
34 Leiter, supra note 2, at 56 (“[T]he problem for Oliphant . . . wasn’t that rules were 
pointless, but rather that [they] were pitched at a level of generality that bore no relation to the 
fact-specific ways in which courts actually decided cases.”). 
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Oliphant’s critique and thereby potentially provided better guidance to 
parties planning their affairs.35 
When judges respond to underdetermination by acting in a legislative or 
quasi-legislative capacity, those legislative judgments are expressed and 
entrenched in doctrine. There is no inconsistency between legislators 
making judgments and enacting legislation based on social or economic 
policy or because of interest group pressures. On the contrary, legislation—
a key form of legal doctrine—is how legislators implement both considered 
judgments and interest group bargains.36 
Doctrine was relevant even for Jerome Frank, the most skeptical Realist. 
For Frank, doctrine’s chief use was to enable judges to rationalize their 
conclusions.37 At its worst, doctrine prevents clear thinking by judges by 
“compelling them to shove their thoughts into traditional forms, thus 
impeding spontaneity and the quick running of ideas.”38 It “often tempt[s] 
the lazy judge away from the proper task of creative thinking to the easier 
work of finding platitudes that will serve in the place of robust cerebration.”39 
However cynical he seems, even Frank did not view judging as entirely 
unconstrained and outcome driven. On the contrary, although adjudication 
starts with a judge’s “hunch” for how the case should come out, legal rules 
and principles (i.e., doctrine) can have real value: 
The conscientious judge, having tentatively arrived at a conclusion, can 
check up to see whether such a conclusion, without unfair distortion of the 
facts, can be linked with the generalized points of view theretofore 
acceptable. If none such are discoverable, he is forced to consider more 
acutely whether his tentative conclusion is wise, both with respect to the 
case before him and with respect to possible implications for future cases.40 
The contrast between Hart and Frank—while overdrawn because of 
Frank’s amusingly idiosyncratic and exaggerated style—is useful for 
                                                            
35 LEITER, supra note 21, at 91 (“[T]he Restatements have internalized the important lesson 
of Oliphant and other Realists . . . .”). 
36 One can argue with Jonathan Macey that the extent to which legislation implements an 
interest group bargain should affect how courts interpret that statute. See generally Jonathan R. 
Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group 
Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986) (arguing that judicial statutory interpretation can allow the 
broader public to benefit from legislation enacted to benefit specific interest groups). 
37 FRANK, supra note 3, at 130 (“We have seen that one of [legal principles’] chief uses is to 
enable the judges to give formal justifications—rationalizations—of the conclusions at which they 
otherwise arrive.”). 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 131. 
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sketching out alternative approaches. For Frank, a judge starts with a hunch, 
derived somehow from a sense of rules and principles of law, “the political, 
economic and moral prejudices of the judge,” and countless other factors.41 
By contrast, for Hart, such an approach is or should be marginal: 
It is possible that, in a given society, judges might always first reach their 
decisions intuitively or “by hunches,” and then merely choose from a 
catalogue of legal rules one which, they pretended, resembled the case in 
hand; they might then claim that this was the rule which they regarded as 
requiring their decision, although nothing else in their actions or words 
suggested that they regarded it as a rule binding on them. Some judicial 
decisions may be like this, but it is surely evident that for the most part 
decisions, like the chess-player’s moves, are reached either by genuine effort 
to conform to rules consciously taken as guiding standards of decision or, if 
intuitively reached, are justified by rules which the judge was antecedently 
disposed to observe and whose relevance to the case in hand would 
generally be acknowledged.42  
There is tremendous variation among Realists and one may cringe at the 
extent to which they were influenced by contemporary intellectual fads, 
whether it be Felix Cohen’s invocation of the Logical Positivism of the 
Vienna Circle43 or Jerome Frank’s Freudianism.44 What stands the test of 
time is their critique of traditional approaches and their ability to penetrate 
legal argumentation.45 Those of us educated in American law schools bear 
their imprint, even if we do not follow them to the end. Many of us share 
the Realists’ belief—often from personal experience—that the outcome of 
interesting cases is underdetermined by traditional legal materials. With the 
Sociological Realists, we look outside the law library to learn about 
                                                            
41 Id. at 104-06 (relying on Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of 
the “Hunch” in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274 (1928)). In an indication of the differences 
among Realists, Felix Cohen rejects the hunch theory of judging as insufficiently empirical. Felix 
S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 843 
(1935) (“[B]y magnifying the personal and accidental factors in judicial behavior, [the hunch 
theory] implicitly denies the relevance of significant, predictable, social determinants that govern 
the course of judicial decision.”). 
42 HART, supra note 11, at 140-41. 
43 Cohen, supra note 41, at 826 (explaining that the Viennese School, “instead of assuming 
hidden causes or transcendental principles behind everything we see or do . . . redefine[s] the 
concepts of abstract thoughts as constructs, or functions, or complexes, or patterns, or 
arrangements, of the things that we do actually see or do”).  
44 FRANK, supra note 3, at 249 n.* (noting the Freudians understanding of the “ambivalent” 
attitude towards the father). 
45 Part I of Cohen’s Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, supra note 41, at 809-
21 should be required reading in the first year of law school. 
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commercial practice and “what makes sense.” On the other hand, many of 
us, from personal experience in counseling, litigation, adjudication, 
teaching, and scholarship, know that doctrine matters even if it does not 
constrain as sharply as judicial opinion writing might suggest. Even the 
most skeptical of us uses legal doctrinal categories to structure our analysis 
and, as my colleagues Shyam Balganesh and Gideon Parchomovsky point 
out, in doing so rule certain considerations out of bounds.46 With Hart, 
many of us believe that a judge, as an interstitial lawmaker, exercises 
delegated authority and generally should not (and, given institutional 
constraints, probably cannot) act with the degree of freedom that a 
legislator has in making legislative judgments. While judges or academics 
may start with a hunch (for lawyers, clients’ interests make hunches 
unnecessary), with Frank, they know that they cannot stop there and must 
convince others to adopt their views.  
Our views are complex and reflect personal variations. But, I submit, a 
“Realist” judge can be identified by two related beliefs: (1) in interesting 
cases, reasonable people can frequently come out either way and (2) in such 
situations, policy considerations are relevant even if not dispositive. I 
suggest below that a “traditionalist” or “formalist” judge approaches matters 
quite differently, at least on the surface. 
With this in mind, I turn to an examination of the role of legal doctrine 
in corporate law by contrasting Delaware and U.K. approaches in two different 
contexts: controlling shareholder freezeouts and bondholder exit consents.47  
V. CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER FREEZEOUTS 
A. Delaware #1: The MFW Litigation 
When a controlling shareholder (CS) enters into a transaction with the 
corporation—for example, selling property to the corporation or buying 
property from the corporation—alarm bells go off. Because the CS’s 
interests as a buyer or seller conflict with the interests of the corporation 
and other shareholders, such transactions raise concerns of self-dealing. 
Every corporate law system must deal with this conflict of interest. In 
Delaware, the basic rule is that such transactions must meet the “entire 
fairness” standard, where entire fairness is understood to be a unitary 
                                                            
46 Shyamkrishna Balganesh and Gideon Parchomovsky, Structure and Value in the Common 
Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1241 (2015). 
47 The following pairs of cases are illustrative rather than comprehensive. 
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analysis of fairness of price and fairness of process, with fairness of price 
measured against a third-party sale benchmark. 
A particularly sharp form of this conflict of interest arises when a CS 
uses its control of the company to buy the shares that it does not already 
own. There are two principal transactional structures through which a CS 
can freeze out the non-controlling shareholders (i.e., buy their shares 
without their consent): (1) a merger between the CS and the corporation or 
(2) a tender offer to acquire 90% followed by a short-form merger under 
Delaware General Corporate Law Section 253.48 In the merger structure, 
the CS uses its influence over the CS-elected directors to induce the board 
to recommend a merger to the shareholders and then votes its control bloc 
in favor of the merger. Under Delaware law, that merger is valid.49 Yet the 
CS faces a clear conflict of interest: as buyer, the CS wants to acquire the 
non-controlling shares at a low price, while as sellers, the non-controlling 
shareholders want to sell their shares at a high price. When a CS freezes out 
non-controlling shareholders through a merger, the leading case of 
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. established that the merger will be treated as a self-
dealing transaction with the CS bearing the burden of establishing entire 
fairness.50  
At the same time, the Delaware Supreme Court suggested that things 
might have been different had the board of directors of the controlled 
subsidiary, UOP, appointed “an independent negotiating committee of its 
outside directors to deal with Signal [, its controlling shareholder,] at arm’s 
length.”51 The court held that “[p]articularly in a parent-subsidiary context, 
a showing that the action taken was as though each of the contending 
parties had in fact exerted its bargaining power against the other at arm’s 
length is strong evidence that the transaction meets the test of fairness.”52  
This holding gave birth to a long line of cases on “cleansing devices” and 
the effect of such measures on the review of the transaction.53 Two 
                                                            
48 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (West 2010). 
49 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (2015) (requiring a majority vote of stockholders of each 
constituent corporation in favor of the proposed merger); see also Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 
A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 1983) (“[W]here corporate action has been approved by an informed vote of a 
majority of the minority shareholders, we conclude that the burden entirely shifts to the plaintiff 
to show that the transaction was unfair to the minority.”). 
50 457 A.2d at 710 (“The requirement of fairness is unflinching in its demand that where one 
stands on both sides of a transaction, he has the burden of establishing its entire fairness, sufficient 
to pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts.”). 
51 Id. at 709 n.7. 
52 Id. (citations omitted). 
53 See William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Function Over Form: A 
Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 1287, 1306-09 
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measures are typically available: (1) an independent special committee and 
(2) disinterested shareholder approval. Kahn v. Lynch Communications 
Systems held that either an effective special committee or fully informed 
disinterested shareholder approval would shift the burden of proof to the 
non-controlling shareholders challenging the transaction, but would not shift 
the standard from entire fairness to the deferential Business Judgment Rule 
(BJR).54  
Given this holding, what is the effect of adopting both an effective 
independent special committee and disinterested shareholder approval? 
Would doing so shift the standard from the entire fairness standard to the 
BJR? Although in the years since Kahn v. Lynch was decided in 1994 there 
were a variety of transactions in which both measures were used, the 
Delaware Supreme Court did not reach this question until the MFW 
litigation in 2013. Many had assumed that the standard would remain entire 
fairness, with only a shift in burden to plaintiffs.55 At the same time, 
important arguments were made that maintaining the stricter scrutiny of 
entire fairness was a bad outcome.56 
The MFW litigation presented a classic doctrinal question, namely, what 
is or should be the rule?57 Before turning to the courts’ analyses, I want to 
pause for some non-doctrinal background. 
What is at stake in the choice between entire fairness and BJR scrutiny? 
From a procedural perspective, the principal difference is whether a CS who 
ensures that “proper procedures” are followed—such as an independent 
special negotiating committee backed up by disinterested shareholder 
approval—can get a case dismissed on summary judgment or whether 
plaintiffs can proceed to trial on the theory that the CS acquired the 
                                                                                                                                     
(2001) (arguing that self-interested transactions that have been ratified through a cleansing 
mechanism should be reviewable under only the business judgment standard). 
54 638 A.2d 1110, 1116 (Del. 1994) (“Entire fairness remains the proper focus of judicial 
analysis in examining an interested merger, irrespective of whether the burden of proof remains 
upon or is shifted away from the controlling or dominating shareholder, because the unchanging 
nature of the underlying “interested” transaction requires careful scrutiny.”). 
55 In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 500 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“Although Lynch did not 
involve a merger conditioned by a controlling stockholder on both procedural protections, 
statements in the decision could be, and were, read as suggesting that a controlling stockholder 
who consented to both procedural protections for the minority would receive no extra legal credit 
for doing so, and that regardless of employing both procedural protections, the merger would be 
subject to review under the entire fairness standard.”). 
56 See Allen et al., supra note 53, at 1307 (“[W]e question whether there is enough utility to 
justify continuing the stricter scrutiny of interested mergers that are approved by one or both of 
these intra-corporate ‘cleansing processes.’”).  
57 MFW, 67 A.3d at 501 (“The court therefore analyzes whether . . . the MFW special 
committee and the majority-of-the-minority vote qualify as cleansing devices under our law.”). 
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non-controlling shares for less than they were worth. This affects the CS’s 
litigation costs and risks of adverse judgment—and thus the settlement 
value of the claim. 
Institutionally, the issue has different implications. The choice between 
entire fairness and BJR scrutiny has an impact on the case load of the 
Delaware Chancery Court—entire fairness trials take a long time—and the 
record that arrives at the Delaware Supreme Court on any appeal—trials 
produce a more complete factual record than summary judgment 
proceedings.  
There are also substantive considerations. Reasonable people may differ 
in their evaluation of the threat posed by CSs. Does the presence of a CS 
lead to better or worse firm performance? Is it frequent or rare that CSs 
mistreat non-controlling shareholders? People also disagree on the extent to 
which entire fairness litigation deters CS misbehavior and compensates 
shareholders. Finally, people may differ in their appraisal of the effectiveness 
of cleansing devices in protecting non-controlling shareholders. When 
implemented, do they actually approximate an arm’s length, third-party 
negotiation—or are they little more than a Potemkin Village?  
Finally, as a matter of forward-looking “social engineering,” the choice 
raises an incentives issue: what incentive is there for a CS to adopt both 
cleansing structures if the second has no effect on the standard of review or 
the burden of proof? 
The MFW case arose out of a transaction in which MacAndrews & 
Forbes (M & F), a holding company owned by Ronald Perelman that held 
43% of the shares of M & F Worldwide (MFW), offered to acquire MFW’s 
remaining shares in a merger.58 In structuring the transaction, M & F 
provided for an independent special committee and a separate vote by the 
57% of the shares that M & F did not own.59 The special committee was 
duly appointed, hired its own advisors, met frequently and negotiated with 
M & F, which eventually raised its offer from $24 to $25 per share.60 The merger 
was subsequently approved by a majority of the non-controlling shares.61 
Then-Chancellor Leo Strine, who had been thinking and writing about 
this issue for a decade,62 opened his opinion with the following statement: 
“This case presents a novel question of law.”63 After Strine provided 
                                                            
58 Id. at 499. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 See generally Allen et al., supra note 53. 
63 MFW, 67 A.3d at 499. With the backdrop of ALR and competing views of adjudication, 
this is an interesting opening. Against the most extreme views of Legal Realists, it assumes that 
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background to the dispute and the debate over the correct rule, he framed 
the question as one of incentives: what incentive is there to adopt both 
prophylactic structures if a CS does not receive any “extra legal credit” for 
doing so?64  
Strine then embarked on a far-reaching analysis in which he 
demonstrated first that the question had not been decided by the Supreme 
Court (and thus, in fact, was open), and second that MFW had in fact 
adopted an effective special committee and fully informed disinterested 
shareholder approval (thereby making it necessary to answer the legal 
question).65 Strine went on to hold that the better rule is that adoption of 
both cleansing devices leads to BJR scrutiny and permits summary judgment 
for the defendants.66 
Most interesting is Strine’s justification for the rule. First, he briefly 
related it to the structure of Delaware corporate law: “This conclusion is 
consistent with the central tradition of Delaware law, which defers to the 
informed decisions of impartial directors, especially when those decisions 
have been approved by the disinterested stockholders on full information 
and without coercion.”67 But then, he argued directly that the proposed rule 
is a good rule:  
Not only that, the adoption of this rule will be of benefit to minority 
stockholders because it will provide a strong incentive for controlling 
stockholders to accord minority investors the transactional structure that 
respected scholars believe will provide them the best protection,68 a 
structure where stockholders get the benefits of independent, empowered 
negotiating agents to bargain for the best price and say no if the agents 
believe the deal is not advisable for any proper reason, plus the critical 
ability to determine for themselves whether to accept any deal that their 
negotiating agents recommend to them. A transactional structure with both 
                                                                                                                                     
there are questions of law and that they matter. Against the narrowest view of the role of the 
judiciary, it assumes that courts are competent to make law. Finally, it raises the question of the 
best model for what a Delaware judge does when the law runs out: does he or she act as a 
legislator? A delegated sub-legislative decisionmaker, specifying details not spelled out in the 
governing legislation? A quasi-administrative agency? A free agent? All of these questions are of 
course within a context in which the Delaware legislature can and sometimes does amend the 
Delaware General Corporate Law to reverse or modify holdings. 
64 Id. at 500. 
65 Id. at 501-02. 
66 Id. at 502.  
67 Id.  
68 Id. at 502 n.5 (citing Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling 
Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 785, 839-40 (2003) and Guhan Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, 115 
Yale L.J. 2, 60-61 (2005)). 
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these protections is fundamentally different from one with only one 
protection. A special committee alone ensures only that there is a 
bargaining agent who can negotiate price and address the collective action 
problem facing stockholders, but it does not provide stockholders any 
chance to protect themselves. A majority-of-the-minority vote provides 
stockholders a chance to vote on a merger proposed by a controller-
dominated board, but with no chance to have an independent bargaining 
agent work on their behalf to negotiate the merger price, and determine 
whether it is a favorable one that the bargaining agent commends to the 
minority stockholders for acceptance at a vote. These protections are 
therefore incomplete and not substitutes, but are complementary and 
effective in tandem.  
Not only that, a controller’s promise that it will not proceed unless the 
special committee assents ensures that the committee will not be bypassed 
by the controller through the intrinsically more coercive setting of a tender 
offer. It was this threat of bypass that was of principal concern in Lynch and 
cast doubt on the special committee’s ability to operate effectively. Precisely 
because the controller can only get business judgment rule treatment if it 
foregoes the chance to go directly to stockholders, any potential for coercion 
is minimized. Indeed, given the high-profile promise the controller has to 
make not to proceed without the committee’s approval, any retributive 
action would be difficult to conceal, and the potent tools entrusted to our 
courts to protect stockholders against violations of the duty of loyalty would 
be available to police retributive action. As important, market realities 
provide no rational basis for concluding that stockholders will not vote 
against a merger they do not favor. Stockholders, especially institutional 
investors who dominate market holdings, regularly vote against 
management on many issues, and do not hesitate to sue, or to speak up. 
Thus, when such stockholders are given a free opportunity to vote no on a 
merger negotiated by a special committee, and a majority of them choose to 
support the merger, it promises more cost than benefit to investors 
generally in terms of the impact on the overall cost of capital to have a 
standard of review other than the business judgment rule. That is especially 
the case because stockholders who vote no, and do not wish to accept the 
merger consideration in a going-private transaction despite the other 
stockholders’ decision to support the merger, will typically have the right to 
seek appraisal.69  
                                                            
69 Id. at 502-03 (all but one footnote omitted). 
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This is a very sophisticated and clearly articulated discussion of the 
various considerations that should inform the adoption of the optimal legal 
rule. On the cost side, Strine found little evidence. From his perspective, 
the main effect of unavoidable entire fairness scrutiny—with the resulting 
difficulty in dismissing meritless cases on summary judgment—was to 
ensure that shareholder litigation would be filed in every CS freeze-out 
merger, which would then be settled for attorneys’ fees but minimal or no 
increase in consideration. 
The opinion provides a fascinating look into how a leading corporate law 
judge at the top of his game understands his judicial role.70 With Hart—and 
with the knowledge that the Delaware legislature sometimes overrules 
decisions of the Delaware courts—Strine clearly understood that he is a 
delegated decisionmaker, charged with filling out an unprovided-for corner 
of the law. But, with the Realists, he spent far more time considering the 
“best” rule on policy grounds than in deep analysis of the principles 
immanent in the cases and how they might be extended to cover the 
unprovided-for situation.  
Yet, there are clear limits to the kind of delegated legislation that is 
acceptable. Strine made a strong argument for the value to minority 
shareholders of both cleansing devices. But, if they are so valuable, why not 
make them mandatory for CS freezeouts? Why offer them merely as an 
option to the CS with the carrot of BJR review? Because to make them 
mandatory, most would agree, would require a change in the statute, while 
shifting burdens of proof and standards of review, all of which were 
invented by the courts, is well within the proper scope of judicial 
                                                            
70 As a 1983 University of Pennsylvania Law School graduate, I can testify personally that 
Strine, a 1988 graduate, would have received a broadly “American Legal Realist” legal education. 
Moreover, in his extrajudicial writings, Strine strikes a broadly Realist stance: 
Judges are lawmakers. Judges do not simply apply settled principles of constitutional 
and statutory law to particular disputes. Rather, in important ways, judges 
themselves determine what the law is. . . . That judges act as policymakers in making 
common law is obviously true. But that truth is discomfiting to many jurists. A 
candid acknowledgement of that truth opens the judiciary, the least politically 
influential branch, to criticism, as acting as lawmakers without the legitimacy to do 
so. Relatedly, to admit that the making of common law necessarily involves the 
judge’s application of his own normative beliefs, rather than the divining of 
discoverable, pre-existing principles of natural law, demystifies the judicial process in 
a way that makes many judges nervous. 
Leo E. Strine, Jr., If Corporate Action Is Lawful, Presumably There Are Circumstances in Which It Is 
Equitable to Take That Action: The Implicit Corollary to the Rule of Schnell v. Chris-Craft, 60 BUS. 
LAW. 877, 877 (2005).  
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“lawmaking.” This is consistent with Hart’s suggestion that interstitial 
lawmaking is akin to administrative agency decisionmaking.71 
Note further that Strine’s approach, which sought to identify the “best” 
rule within the limits of his delegated authority (subject to review by the 
Supreme Court), gives clear marching orders to lawyers litigating cases: 
they need to address these concerns. It means that law review or finance 
articles that address the issues are relevant,72 and it may even encourage 
lawyers to hire academics to prepare reports supporting advantageous 
policies.73 The case was affirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court, which—
despite placing greater emphasis on the need to satisfy the BJR 
preconditions prior to trial, without which entire fairness would apply—
largely adopted the reasoning of the Chancery Court.74 
                                                            
71 For a fuller discussion of the extent to which the Delaware Chancery Court acts like an 
administrative agency, complete with notice and comment, see William Savitt, The Genius of the 
Modern Chancery System, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 570, 586 (2012). 
72 Strine himself cites to them, as in the passage quoted supra note 70. 
73 Although Strine’s opinion focused on what the rule should be, it provides a useful 
illustration of the different roles that doctrine plays in even a largely Realist analysis, including the 
following (each of these illustrates ways in which doctrine is used and useful as a matter of 
standard litigation practice, without implicating underlying jurisprudential commitments):  
First, Strine cited a variety of cases to provide an overall conceptual structure to the analysis 
and to make clear who is expected to prove what. For example, in describing the standard for 
determining director independence and determining whether there are financial ties with an 
interested party, he asserted, with citation to Delaware Supreme Court cases, that  
the question is whether those ties are material, in the sense that the alleged ties could 
have affected the impartiality of the director. Our Supreme Court has rejected the 
suggestion that the correct standard for materiality is a “reasonable person” standard; 
rather, it is necessary to look to the financial circumstances of the director in 
question to determine materiality. 
MFW, 67 A.3d at 509-10 (footnotes omitted). 
Second, he cited to cases and statutes to identify specific propositions of law, for example, 
when he cited Bershad to support the assertion that “[u]nder Delaware law, MacAndrews & Forbes 
had no duty to sell its block.” Id. at 508 n.31 (citing Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840 
(Del. 1987)).  
Third, he cited to cases as a shorthand description of contrasting factual or legal situations. 
For example, when he examined whether the special committee had met the standards for being a 
cleansing device, he wrote that “the special committee was empowered not simply to ‘evaluate’ the 
offer, like some special committees with weak mandates, but to negotiate with MacAndrews & 
Forbes over the terms of its offer to buy out the noncontrolling stockholders,” and provided 
support by citing a variety of cases in which that was not the case. Id. at 507-08 (footnotes 
omitted) (referencing the restrictions on special committees discussed in Am. Mining Corp. v. 
Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213, 1244-46 (Del. 2012) and Brinckerhoff v. Tex. E. Prods. Pipeline Co., 986 A.2d 
370, 381 (Del. Ch. 2010)). 
74 Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 645-46, 654 (Del. 2014). 
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B. United Kingdom #1: The Definition of “Class” in a Scheme of Arrangement 
To put the Delaware style in context, I want to consider a line of cases 
that raises similar issues from a jurisdiction uninfluenced by American 
Legal Realism, namely, the United Kingdom. U.K. Company Law provides 
two main ways for combining companies and thus, essentially two ways to 
complete a going-private transaction: through a tender offer or a “scheme of 
arrangement.”75  
To acquire 100% ownership of a class of stock through a tender offer, the 
bidder’s offer must be accepted by 90% of the shares to which it relates. If 
this threshold is met, the bidder may acquire the remaining shares on the 
same terms as the tender offer.76 As in the United States, it is far from 
trivial to reach the 90% threshold.  
As a result, the amalgamation of companies is sometimes accomplished 
through a “scheme of arrangement,” a structure roughly equivalent to 
Delaware’s classical merger (but, as we will see, also different in material 
respects). 
The current version, section 425 of the Companies Act of 1985, provides 
that: 
 (1) Where a compromise or arrangement is proposed between a 
company and its creditors, or any class of them, or between the company 
and its members, or any class of them, the court may on the application of 
the company or any creditor or member of it or, in the case of a company 
being wound up, of the liquidator, order a meeting of the creditors or class 
of creditors, or of the members of the company or class of members (as the 
case may be), to be summoned in such manner as the court directs. 
(2) If a majority in number representing three-fourths in value of the 
creditors or class of creditors or members or class of members (as the case 
may be), present and voting either in person or by proxy at the meeting, 
agree to any compromise or arrangement, the compromise or arrangement, 
if sanctioned by the court, is binding on all creditors or the class of creditors 
or on the members or class of members (as the case may be), and also on the 
                                                            
75 Jennifer Payne, Schemes of Arrangement, Takeovers and Minority Shareholder Protection, 2 J. 
CORP. L. STUD. 67, 67 (2011) (“A scheme of arrangement involves a compromise or arrangement 
. . . between a company and (a) its creditors, or any class of them, or (b) its members, or any class 
of them.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
76 PAUL L. DAVIES & SARAH WORTHINGTON, GOWER & DAVIES: PRINCIPLES OF 
MODERN COMPANY LAW ¶ 28-68, at 1091-92 (9th ed. 2012) (discussing the “post-bid 
consequences of a successful offer”). 
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company or, in the case of a company in the course of being wound up, on 
the liquidator and contributories of the company.77 
There are thus three steps in the approval of a scheme of arrangement in 
a going-private transaction: a compromise or arrangement, approval by the 
shareholders, and approval by the court. When all three steps are 
completed, dissenting shareholders can be forced out. From a shareholder’s 
perspective, the protection of a tender offer’s 90% threshold is replaced with 
a lower threshold (a majority in number and 75% in value of shares present 
and voting) combined with court review of the transaction.  
As a window into different judicial and jurisprudential styles, I want to 
consider the line of cases discussing the creation of classes in the approval of 
a scheme of arrangement. In CS going-private transactions, a core issue 
becomes when non-controlling shareholders should have a veto right: with 
approval by each class mandatory, creating a class grants the members of 
that class the ability to block a scheme. 
In the 1975 Chancery Division case, In re Hellenic & General Trust, the 
CS, Hambros, sought to acquire 100% ownership of a controlled subsidiary, 
Hellenic & General Trust (HGT), in which the National Bank of Greece 
(NBG) held a 13.95% interest.78 Because of NBG’s opposition, Hambros 
could not use a tender offer, as it could not achieve the 90% threshold for 
freezing out the minority shares.79 Hambros instead turned to a scheme of 
arrangement structure. After creating a wholly-owned subsidiary, 
Merchandise & Investment Trust (MIT), to hold its 53% share of HGT, 
Hambros proposed a scheme of arrangement in which all shares of HGT 
would be canceled in exchange for 48p per share, with Hambros receiving 
new ordinary shares.80  
NBG opposed the transaction and HGT’s petition seeking sanction of 
the court. The court called a meeting of all the shareholders, at which the 
resolution passed with 91% of the shareholders supporting the transaction.81 
If the MIT shares had not been counted, however, the resolution would not 
have received the required 75% approval.82  
With Hambros’s obvious conflict of interest—as controlling shareholder, 
it wanted to acquire the shares it did not own at a low price, while non-
controlling shareholders wanted to sell their shares at a high price—the 
                                                            
77 Companies Act, 1985, c. 6, § 425 (U.K.).  
78 [1975] 1 W.L.R. 123, 124 (Eng.). 
79 Id. at 127. 
80 Id. at 125. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
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question before the court was whether that conflict of interest was relevant 
and, if so, how?83 Should Hambros and the non-controlling shareholders 
vote together in the same class, or should there be two separate classes, 
allowing the non-controlling shareholders to vote separately?84 The 
argument for all ordinary shares voting together was that they had identical 
legal rights as ordinary shareholders. The argument for separate classes is 
that Hambros, the buyer, and the non-controlling shareholders, had 
diametrically opposed interests.  
In his judgement, Templeman J. reviewed a variety of cases. The scheme 
of arrangement has been part of U.K. Company Law since 1870, and there 
are important cases dating back to the nineteenth century.85 Templeman J. 
began the analysis with a reference to a 1910 case which held that holders of 
partly paid shares formed a different class from holders of fully paid 
shares.86 He then quoted a key portion of the Court of Appeal’s 1892 
judgment in Sovereign Life Assurance Co. v. Dodd, which held that 
policyholders whose claims had matured were in a different class than those 
whose policies had not matured: 
It seems plain that we must give such a meaning to the term “class” as will 
prevent the section being so worked as to result in confiscation and 
injustice, and that it must be confined to those persons whose rights are not 
so dissimilar as to make it impossible for them to consult together with a 
view to their common interest.87 
This led Templeman J. to his key finding that “[v]endors consulting 
together with a view to their common interest in an offer made by a 
purchaser would look askance at the presence among them of a wholly 
owned subsidiary of the purchaser.”88 
The Hellenic & General Trust holding stands for the proposition that the 
divergence of interests among shareholders will sometimes be sufficiently 
great as to justify separate classes. But, when is that the case, and, is the 
creation of separate classes the right way to handle this conflict of interest? 
                                                            
83 Id.  
84 Id.  
85 See DAVIES & WORTHINGTON, supra note 76, § 29-2 (explaining that the scheme of 
arrangement provisions were introduced by the Joint Stock Companies Arrangement Act of 1870). 
86 In re Hellenic & General Trust, [1975] 1 W.L.R. at 125 (citing In re United Provident 
Assurance Co., [1910] 2 Ch. 477 (Eng.)). 
87 Id. at 126 (quoting Sovereign Life Assurance Co. v. Dodd, [1892] 2 Q.B. 573, 582 (Eng.)). 
88 Id. 
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The 1999 case Re BTR plc addressed some of these questions.89 In BTR, a 
scheme of arrangement was being used for an arm’s length purchase of 
publicly traded BTR by publicly traded Siebe.90 The objector, who opposed 
Siebe proceeding by scheme of arrangement rather than by tender offer, 
argued that the interests of BTR shareholders differed substantially as 
between those who held only BTR shares and those who held mainly Siebe 
shares.91 The objector argued that putting all shareholders with such 
divergent interests in a single class was inappropriate under Section 425 of 
the U.K. Companies Act.92 
As with Templeman J.’s judgment in Hellenic & General Trust, Parker J. 
looked to historic precedent and began with the key language from the 1892 
case, Sovereign Life Assurance.93 He then turned to a 1991 decision from the 
High Court of Hong Kong, In re Industrial Equity (Pacific) Ltd., which 
rejected a similar argument, holding that shareholders’ differing interests 
were better considered when the court decided whether to sanction the 
scheme: 
Common shareholders’ holdings of BIL shares could conceivably range in 
value from a minute, totally insignificant fraction of their IEP shares, to a 
totally overwhelming quantity, many times the latter. At which point would 
a conflicting or different interest to that of an IEP shareholder without BIL 
shares arise? Is every different interest to constitute a different class? 
Clearly not, but where then is the line to be drawn? The difficulties in 
identifying shareholders with such interests, as in the present case, could 
raise in terms of practicality virtually insuperable difficulties. It is 
determination by reference to rights of shareholders that meets such 
difficulties, while leaving any conflict of interest which may result in a 
minority being overborne or coerced to be dealt with by the courts when 
their sanction is sought.94 
Adopting this analysis, Parker J. turned to Hellenic & General Trust in an 
attempt to square his approach through an argument that Templeman J. had 
really been doing the same thing:  
                                                            
89 [1999] 2 B.C.L.C. 675 (Ch.) (U.K.), leave to appeal denied in [2000] 1 B.C.L.C. 740 (C.A.) 
(U.K.). 
90 Id. at 675. 
91 Id. at 690-81. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 681.  
94 Id. at 681-82 (quoting In re Industrial Equity (Pacific) Ltd., [1991] 2 H.K.L.R. 614, 625 (H.C.)). 
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Templeman J effectively discounted the views of the registered holder of 
those shares and he did so, as I read the judgment, on the basis that in 
substance the scheme affected only the remainder of the shares. . . . It 
does not, as I see it, involve any analysis of interests and rights, nor is it 
inconsistent with the submission made by Mr [sic] Sykes (which I accept) 
that the relevant test is that of differing rights rather than differing 
interests.95  
The Court of Appeals agreed with Parker J. and refused leave to 
appeal.96 The BTR analysis now prevails in schemes of arrangement, 
including when such schemes are used in going-private transactions.97 
Note the approach in the cases discussed above. Each judge recognized 
the core conflict of interest among shareholders and the statutory 
alternatives for dealing with it, either as separate classes or as part of the 
judge’s review in deciding whether to sanction the scheme. And, each judge 
recognized and analyzed the practical implications of adopting one solution 
over the other.  
But the style is quite different from what we see in Delaware. Each U.K. 
judgment worked through the cases, starting with the 1892 Sovereign Life 
Assurance judgment. In working through the cases and teasing out the 
reasoning and holdings, the judges made arguments about which approach 
made the most practical sense, while incorporating these considerations as 
part of the understanding of what prior courts had held.  
VI. THE TREATMENT OF EXIT CONSENTS IN                                     
BOND EXCHANGE OFFERS 
A. Delaware #2: Katz v. Oak Industries 
Corporate bonds are issued pursuant to complex contracts that make a 
variety of promises and provide a variety of protections. When the issuer 
encounters financial difficulties, predictable conflicts arise, often in the 
shadow of bankruptcy. It is sometimes the case that the issuer wishes to 
adjust its obligations downward outside of bankruptcy, while the bondholders, 
or some of them, think or claim that they will do better in Chapter 11.  
Bonds issued under U.S. law are subject to the Trust Indenture Act, 
which effectively blocks modifications of the bond’s acceleration or payment 
                                                            
95 Id. at 682. 
96 Re BTR plc, [2000] 1 B.C.L.C. at 740-41.  
97 See Payne, supra note 75, at 91-92 (distinguishing Hellenic & General Trust and BTR). 
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terms, including the principal amount and the interest rate.98 As a result, 
issuers who wish to restructure their obligations outside of bankruptcy 
typically offer to exchange the old bonds for new bonds (an “exchange 
offer”), along with a pledge of votes to support changes to the terms of the 
old bonds that make non-exchanging bondholders worse off (known as an 
“exit consent”).99 
Katz v. Oak Industries involved an exchange offer combined with a 
consent solicitation by an issuer, Oak Industries, in financial distress.100 Oak 
had offered to exchange old bonds for new ones on the condition that a 
certain proportion be tendered, and that tendering bondholders consent to 
amendments to the underlying indentures which would remove significant 
negotiated protections to holders.101 These changes included the deletion of 
financial covenants, the removal of which adversely affected non-tendered 
bonds. All the indentures had collective action clauses that allowed 
provisions to be modified with approval of a majority of the bondholders.102 
A bondholder sought to enjoin the exchange offer and exit consent on 
the grounds that it “coerced” bondholders into tendering and consenting to 
the amendments for fear of being left with unprotected, and therefore less 
valuable, bonds.103 
The case was before the legendary Chancellor William T. Allen (1985-1997), 
whose opinions continue to frame many of the most important issues in 
Delaware corporate law. To begin, Allen considered the plaintiff ’s allegation 
that the purpose and effect of the exchange offer was to benefit shareholders 
at the expense of bondholders. Allen rejected the claim outright.104 
Although shareholders may, in fact, benefit at the bondholders’ expense, 
                                                            
98 Trust Indenture Act of 1939 § 316(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp(a) (2012) (“The indenture to be 
qualified shall automatically be deemed . . . to direct the time, method, and place . . . [and] to 
consent to the waiver of any past default and its consequences . . . .”). 
99 See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Fixing the Trust Indenture Act to Allow Restructuring Votes, HARVARD 
L. SCH. BANKR. ROUNDTABLE (Feb. 3, 2015), https://blogs.law.harvard.edu/bankruptcyround 
table/2015/02/03/fixing-the-trust-indenture-act-to-allow-restructuring-votes (“To get a deal done 
when there are economically-important holdouts, deal proponents often seek exit consents to 
induce enough holdout bondholders to reluctantly tender into a deal they don’t otherwise like, by 
stripping the bond indenture of those covenants on which bondholders can vote.”), archived at 
http://perma.cc/366D-KTR9. 
100 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986). 
101 Id. at 875-877. 
102 Id.  
103 Id. at 878 (“[P]laintiff ’s claim is that no free choice is provided to bondholders by the 
exchange offer and consent solicitation. . . . [The] bondholder is coerced to tender and thus to 
consent to the proposed indenture amendments.”). 
104 Id. at 879 (“[T]he first aspect . . . about which Plaintiff complains . . . does not itself 
appear to allege a cognizable legal wrong.”).  
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Allen held that, because bondholders are not owed fiduciary duties, the 
harm did not constitute a legal wrong in the absence of legislative direction 
or indenture provisions providing such protection.105  
He turned next to the plaintiff ’s main claim that the corporation’s 
actions violated the “implied covenant of good faith,”106 formulating the 
appropriate legal test as follows:  
[I]s it clear from what was expressly agreed upon that the parties who 
negotiated the express terms of the contract would have agreed to proscribe 
the act later complained of as a breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith—had they thought to negotiate with respect to that matter. If the 
answer to this question is yes, then, in my opinion, a court is justified in 
concluding that such act constitutes a breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith.107 
Answering this question required turning to the parties’ contract, the 
Trust Indenture, to see if one could infer that had the parties “negotiated 
with the exchange offer and consent solicitation in mind[, they] would have 
expressly agreed to prohibit contractually the linking of the giving of 
consent with the purchase and sale of the security.”108 With no provision in 
the indenture prohibiting Oak from offering inducements to bondholders to 
consent to amendments, the closest provision the plaintiff could identify 
was a prohibition on the voting of treasury securities.109 Allen did not read 
this provision as protecting the plaintiff, however: 
The evident purpose of the restriction on the voting of treasury securities is 
to afford protection against the issuer voting as a bondholder in favor of 
modifications that would benefit it as issuer, even though such changes 
would be detrimental to bondholders. But the linking of the exchange offer 
and the consent solicitation does not involve the risk that bondholder 
interests will be affected by a vote involving anyone with a financial interest 
in the subject of the vote other than a bondholder’s interest. That the 
consent is to be given concurrently with the transfer of the bond to the 
issuer does not in any sense create the kind of conflict of interest that the 
indenture’s prohibition on voting treasury securities contemplates. Not only 
will the proposed consents be granted or withheld only by those with a 
                                                            
105 Id. at 878-79. 
106 Id. at 880 (“Modern contract law has generally recognized an implied covenant to the effect 
that each party to a contract will act with good faith towards the other . . . .”).  
107 Id.  
108 Id. at 880-81.  
109 Id. at 881.  
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financial interest to maximize the return on their investment in Oak’s 
bonds, but the incentive to consent is equally available to all members of 
each class of bondholders. Thus the “vote” implied by the consent 
solicitation is not affected in any sense by those with a financial conflict of 
interest.110 
The opinion is brief but analytically sharp. It focused on the core 
substantive issue with minimal (although sufficient) citations to case law 
and a few citations to law review articles, including a slightly off-topic 
citation to articles on the deeper implications of consent in the 
establishment of legal norms.111 Twenty-eight years later, Katz remains the 
leading U.S. case on exit consents.112  
B. United Kingdom  #2: Assénagon and Azevedo 
In the aftermath of the 2008 worldwide financial crisis, two exchange 
offers combined with exit consents were challenged under U.K. law.  
First, Assénagon arose out of financial difficulties at the Anglo Irish 
Bank.113 The relevant Trust Deed provided different bondholder quorum 
requirements for various modifications, with the most stringent requirements—
two-thirds of the nominal amount of the notes—for “extraordinary 
resolution[s,]” including “reduction or cancellation of the principal payable 
on the Notes or the exchange or conversion thereof or the minimum rate of 
interest payable thereon . . . .”114 Approval of extraordinary resolutions required 
a three-fourths majority of persons voting.115 Note that, under the United 
States’ Trust Indenture Act, these types of changes can only be made with 
unanimous consent.116 That is, U.K. law permits modifications by collective 
action prohibited under U.S. law.  
In announcing the exchange offer in which the old bonds would be 
replaced with new bonds, the bank also convened a meeting to approve 
                                                            
110 Id.  
111 Id. at 879 n.8 (comparing law review articles discussing the “implications of consent in the 
establishment of legal norms”). 
112 See, e.g., Keegan S. Drake, Note, The Fall and Rise of the Exit Consent, 63 DUKE L.J. 1589, 
1604 (2014) (“Katz’s progeny totals more than seventy cases, some related to exit consents, others 
simply construing the good faith duty.”) (footnotes omitted). 
113 Assénagon Asset Mgmt. S.A. v. Irish Bank Resolution Corp., [2012] EWHC (Ch) 2090, 
[6] (Eng.).  
114 Id. at [15]. 
115 Id. at [18]. 
116 Trust Indenture Act of 1939 § 316(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp(b) (2012) (“[T]he right of any 
holder of any indenture security to receive payment of the principal of and interest on such 
indenture security . . . shall not be impaired or affected without the consent of such holder . . . .”). 
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amendments that would give it the right to redeem existing notes for 0.01 
Euro per 1,000 Euros in principal amount.117 In other words, if passed, the 
amendment would have rendered the existing bonds worthless.  
As Briggs J. (then, of the High Court Chancery Division and now, of 
the Court of Appeals) noted, this change was designed to create a version of 
the prisoners’ dilemma.118 Absent the ability to coordinate effectively with 
other bondholders, each bondholder would have to assume that enough of 
the other bondholders would tender to approve the amendment, thereby 
rendering the non-tendered bonds worthless.119 In such a situation, 
bondholders would be irrational not to tender. 
The consent solicitation was attacked by the bondholders on three 
grounds: (1) that it was ultra vires, (2) that the notes once tendered were 
held for the benefit of the bank and therefore the consents could not be 
voted under the terms of the Trust Deed, and (3) that the tendering of 
consents represented an “abuse of power” by the majority bondholders.120 
Note that the bondholders raised claims quite different from the “implied 
covenant of good faith” claim in Katz.121 
Briggs J. rejected the first ground because of an explicit collective action 
provision in the Trust Deed that permitted a three-fourths majority to 
approve an extraordinary resolution for the “[r]eduction or cancellation of 
the principal payable on the Notes . . . or the minimum rate of interest 
payable thereon.”122  
The second ground was based on a disenfranchisement clause in the 
Trust Deed that provided that, “[n]either the Issuer nor any Subsidiary shall 
be entitled to vote at any meeting in respect of Notes beneficially held by it 
or for its account.”123 The clause would seem to apply if one focused on the 
time of the noteholders’ meeting, at which point the bank held the consents 
and the contract for acquiring the notes.124 On the other hand, the clause 
would not apply if one focused on the time when noteholders made the 
decision to offer their notes for exchange and thereby committed to voting 
for the resolution.125 Briggs J. viewed this as a close question but held that 
the clause applied to sterilize the consents.126 In doing so, he examined the 
                                                            
117 Assénagon, [2012] EWHC (Ch) 2090 at [30].  
118 Id. at [4]. 
119 Id. at [3]-[4]. 
120 Id. at [39]. 
121 See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
122 Assénagon, [2012] EWHC (Ch) 2090 at [54]. 
123 Id. at [16]. 
124 Id. at [56]. 
125 Id. at [57]-[58]. 
126 Id. at [63]-[64]. 
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similar point raised in Katz regarding treasury securities, but declined to 
follow Chancellor Allen’s rejection on the grounds that there were 
substantial differences in the contractual language.127  
Recognizing the closeness of the second ground, Briggs J. then turned to 
the most ambitious and interesting argument, the “abuse of majority” 
principle.128 Here, one sees how one English judge plows new ground, while 
making it seem old. The core theory, advanced by the bondholders and 
accepted by Briggs J., is the general principle that when a majority acts, it 
cannot benefit itself at the expense of the minority.129 In developing his 
argument, Briggs J. adopted an historical/doctrinal approach. 
Starting with Justinian’s Institutes, Briggs J. reviewed the 1853 
partnership case of Blisset v. Daniel, and continued to the present.130 With 
copious quotes and citations, he argued that there is a longstanding 
principle that restricts majority action, clearly articulated by Viscount 
Haldane in 1927 in British America Nickel Corp. v. M J O’Brien Ltd.:  
To give a power to modify the terms on which debentures in a company are 
secured is not uncommon in practice. The business interests of the company 
may render such a power expedient, even in the interests of the class of 
debenture holders as a whole. The provision is usually made in the form of 
a power, conferred by the instrument constituting the debenture security, 
upon the majority of the class of holders. It often enables them to modify, 
by resolution properly passed, the security itself. The provision of such a 
power to a majority bears some analogy to such a power as that conferred by 
s.13 of the English Companies Act of 1908, which enables a majority of the 
shareholders by special resolution to alter the articles of association. There 
is, however, a restriction on such powers, when conferred on a majority of a 
special class in order to enable that majority to bind a minority. They must 
be exercised subject to a general principle, which is applicable to all 
authorities conferred on majorities of classes enabling them to bind 
minorities; namely, that the power given must be exercised for the purpose 
of benefiting the class as a whole, and not merely individual members only. 
Subject to this, the power may be unrestricted.131  
                                                            
127 Id. at [62]. 
128 Id. at [69]-[70]. 
129 Id. at [70]. 
130 Id. at [41].  
131 Id. at [43] (quoting Brit. Am. Nickel Corp. v. M. J. O’Brien Ltd., [1927] A.C. 369 (P.C.) 
371-72 (Can.)).  
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This principle, Haldane showed, applies to shareholders, bondholders, 
creditors more generally, and whenever majorities have the power to bind 
minorities.132 
To rebut this principle, the bank argued that the proposal, considered as 
a whole, was approved by bondholders because it was economically 
beneficial.133 In making this argument, the bank relied on cases that had 
held that an inducement, properly disclosed, will not be considered an abuse 
of power.134 
In response, the claimant focused on the effect of the resolution itself on 
the date it was passed, and the fact that it would have left dissenting 
noteholders holding worthless notes (unlike, for example, a structure in 
which all noteholders would receive new notes if the resolution were 
approved).135 In essence, the disagreement became whether the bank’s action 
was best understood as an offer or a threat.136  
The distinction between an offer and a threat became the basis for 
distinguishing the contemporaneous Azevedo case in which bondholders 
were asked to approve a postponement of interest payments in exchange for 
a fully disclosed “consent payment.”137 The court held this exchange valid 
because a fully disclosed offer cannot be an improper bribe.138 
Briggs J. distinguished Assénagon from Azevedo on two grounds. First, 
he focused on the resolution changing the old bonds, rather than on the 
offer of new bonds, to argue that there was “a negative inducement” (i.e., a 
threat) to deter noteholders from refusing the exchange.139 Second, he 
focused on the various substantive differences between the two cases, 
including the role played by the resolution.140 For example, in Azevedo, the 
goal was to postpone interest payments, while in Assénagon, the goal was to 
exchange the notes for new ones, with the resolution acting as a threat to 
                                                            
132 Brit. Am. Nickel Corp. v. M. J. O’Brien Ltd., [1927] A.C. 369 (P.C.) 371-72 (Can.). As far 
as I can tell, there is no parallel principle in Delaware corporate law. This may well be a result of 
Delaware’s board-centric corporate law in contrast to the United Kingdom’s shareholder-centric 
law. When, as in the United Kingdom, you allow shareholders to act directly, that power must be 
regulated. In Delaware, by contrast, shareholders, even with a supermajority, cannot do much of 
anything directly, other than change the bylaws and remove directors. With so little power, there is 
less need to control the “abuse of majority power” under Delaware corporate law.  
133 Assénagon, [2012] EWHC (Ch) 2090 at [71]. 
134 Id. at [72].  
135 Id. at [70]. 
136 Id. at [77]. 
137 Azevedo v. Imcopa Importacao, [2012] EWHC (Comm) 1849, [12]-[13] (Eng.).  
138 Id. at [54] (finding that the consent payments offered “are inconsistent with any case of 
bribery, fraud or illegality”). 
139 Assénagon, [2012] EWHC (Ch) 2090 at [83].  
140 Id. 
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those who did not tender.141 Additionally, in Azevedo, the issuer made the 
offer, while in Assénagon, the other noteholders imposed the harm.142 In 
Azevedo, the postponement of interest payments could benefit noteholders 
by allowing time to restructure while in Assénagon, the resolution destroyed 
the value of the notes with “no conceivable benefit” to the noteholders.143 
Finally, in Azevedo, there was no claim of oppression or unfairness, only a 
claim of bribery, while in Assénagon, a charge of oppression was central.144 
In the end, then, Briggs J. combined an historical/doctrinal review of the 
cases with an analysis of the effect of the exit consent on the noteholders’ 
decision to conclude that oppression had been established.145 It is a very 
elegant example of classic legal reasoning. 
My interest here is not in whether Katz and Assénagon were correctly 
decided, but in their style of reasoning and expression. In fact, I believe that 
both cases were decided correctly because of the differences in the 
background institutional setting. Under the U.S. Trust Indenture Act, 
changes in principal or interest require unanimous consent, so the kind of 
modification at issue in Assénagon could not occur. The inflexibility of the 
Trust Indenture Act, in turn, introduces a degree of rigidity—one response 
to which is exit consents. By contrast, in the United Kingdom, a 
straightforward resolution changing the terms of the bonds could have been 
put to a noteholder vote. With such a possibility, the use of the exit consent 
that threatens holdouts with ruin as a spur to offer notes in the exchange is 
less defensible.  
VII. THE LEGAL REALIST VERSUS THE TRADITIONAL STYLE 
With regard to the substance of these corporate law cases, specialist 
judges in both systems, aided by specialist lawyers, clearly identify and 
understand the core issues involved. Adjusting for differences in 
background law, it seems likely that the disputes would ultimately be 
resolved in more or less the same way in each system. This is unsurprising 
in a field such as corporate law, where market and institutional pressures 
demand practical solutions to practical problems. 
                                                            
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Id.; Azevedo, [2012] EWHC (Comm) at [13]-[14] (explaining that interest postponement 
was key to restructuring).  
144 Assénagon, [2012] EWHC (Ch) 2090 at [83]; Azevedo, [2012] EWHC (Comm) at [17] 
(setting forth the basis of a claim alleging an unlawful consent payment in the nature of a bribe).  
145 Assénagon, [2012] EWHC (Ch) 2090 at [85] (“This form of coercion is in my judgment 
entirely at variance with the purposes for which majorities in a class are given power to bind 
minorities . . . .”). 
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But the styles of decisionmaking are strikingly different. At the risk of 
overstatement, in the Delaware cases, the policy issue is presented explicitly, 
with cases brought forward as illustrations of the issue or to check that a 
conclusion is consistent with the main lines of precedent. You can almost 
hear the judge saying, “This is an interesting and important question. Let’s 
look for the best answer to that question anywhere we might find it—in law 
review articles, economics articles or even old cases. Having figured out the 
right answer, let’s go back and check to make sure that it is not inconsistent 
with what came before.” 
In U.K. judgments, by contrast, the discussion of the cases is the way in 
which the policy issues are articulated and resolved. The judges almost seem 
to say, “This is an interesting question. Let’s go look at the cases and see 
what they say so that I can figure out what I think about it.” To the extent 
that they seek to convey that impression, there is a rather obvious but 
harmless disingenuousness. In Assénagon, Briggs J. identified the issue, took 
a position on it and then marshalled the legal materials to make the most 
convincing argument for that position. In Katz, Chancellor Allen did the 
same thing.  
These stylistic differences derive from, or reflect, the different implicit 
jurisprudence in the two systems. In a Realist system, where one is taught 
that indeterminacy is pervasive and that, in the interesting cases, policy 
considerations are paramount, it is entirely natural and appropriate to state 
the policy issue explicitly and then to resolve it as best one can. In a 
traditional, doctrinalist system that operates on the assumption that nearly 
all cases can be resolved by a careful analysis of precedent and that the 
judge, even in resolving gaps, is very much a delegated decisionmaker (an 
agent not just of the legislature but also of the arc of precedent), it is 
entirely natural and appropriate to build policy arguments from within the 
case law. 
These stylistic differences have real implications. In a Realist system, 
policy analyses can be persuasive to the court, as can retaining experts to 
submit reports or to testify on the optimal policy. Delaware judges regularly 
participate in academic conferences, publish articles in academic journals, 
and become informed consumers of academic research. In such a system, 
citing to finance literature or economically influenced policy analysis in 
legal academic literature is common and unremarkable. 
As an illustration, return to Chancellor Strine’s opinion in MFW. In 
summarizing the arguments of counsel and prior cases, Strine presented the 
issue as one of policy:  
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In prior cases, this court has outlined the development of the case law in 
this area, as have distinguished scholars, and there is no need to repeat that 
recitation. The core legal question is framed by the parties’ contending 
positions. For their part, the defendants say that it would be beneficial 
systemically to minority stockholders to review transactions structured with 
both procedural protections under the business judgment rule. Absent an 
incentive to do so, the defendants argue that controlling stockholders will 
not agree upfront to both protections, thus denying minority stockholders 
access to the transaction structure most protective of their interests—one 
that gives them the benefit of an active and empowered bargaining agent to 
negotiate price and to say no, plus the ability to freely decide for themselves 
on full information whether to accept any deal approved by that agent. This 
structure is not common now because controlling stockholders have no 
incentive under the law to agree to it, and such an incentive is needed 
because it involves the controller ceding potent power to the independent 
directors and minority stockholders. The defendants argue that the benefits 
of their preferred approach are considerable, and that the costs are 
negligible because there is little utility to having an expensive, judicially 
intensive standard of review when stockholders can protect themselves by 
voting no if they do not like the recommendation of a fully empowered 
independent committee that exercised due care. In support of that 
argument, the defendants can cite to empirical evidence showing that the 
absence of a legally recognized transaction structure that can invoke the 
business judgment rule standard of review has resulted not in litigation that 
generates tangible positive results for minority stockholders in the form of 
additional money in their pockets, but in litigation that is settled for fees 
because there is no practical way of getting the case dismissed at the 
pleading stage and the costs of discovery and entanglement in multiyear 
litigation exceed the costs of paying attorneys’ fees. Finally, the defendants 
note that Delaware law on controlling stockholder going-private 
transactions is now inconsistent, with the intrinsically more coercive route 
of using a tender offer to accomplish a going-private transaction escaping 
the full force of equitable review, when a similarly structured merger where 
a less coercive chance to say no exists would not.146 
This passage contains comprehensive citations to prior cases, to law 
review literature, and to expert affidavits filed in the case. The point is not 
that Strine ignored the cases. Rather, the Delaware style is to present the 
issue as one of policy and then to analyze it. The way in which the issue is 
                                                            
146 In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 525 (Del. Ch. 2013) (citations omitted). 
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presented in the opinion shows what perhaps is so obvious to readers and 
writers of Delaware corporate law that it is hardly visible: that, as a 
conventional or normative matter, explicit policy discussions are acceptable 
and even necessary, at least when there is an open question of law. This kind 
of discussion not only frees lawyers to argue policy but likely forces them to 
do so. While the “output” is doctrinal—a statement of a rule of law to 
govern this case and future cases—the “inputs” will be both doctrinal (how 
the new rule fits with the overall doctrinal structure of Delaware corporate 
law) and substantive (what is the best rule from a social policy perspective). 
Contrast this with Briggs’s resolution of an equally open question in 
Assénagon. It is not that Briggs hid the fact that the validity of exit consents 
was an open question under U.K. law or that important policy considerations 
were at stake. But, his approach to addressing those issues speaks volumes 
about a different set of implicit jurisprudential understandings and norms. 
Briggs began with Justinian and proceeded largely chronologically because he 
emerged from a system in which the practice is to make normative arguments 
through the analysis of past cases with a careful parsing of holdings to 
identify the underlying principle (the ratio decidendi) to be applied to the 
current controversy.  
Indeed, in a traditionalist system such as Briggs’s, the “nonlegal” 
materials that Delaware judges so freely incorporate seem to be kept at 
arm’s length. In the affirmance in Azevedo, the Court of Appeals recognized 
that the validity of exit consents was an issue of first impression.147 Then, 
having also recognized that the issue is a version of the “prisoner’s 
dilemma,” the court (per Lloyd L.J.) considered an alternative game 
theoretic framework: 
Another graphic description of the uncertainty faced by an individual voter 
in this situation is called the Trembling Hand Perfect Nash equilibrium, as 
discussed in an article, “Do Bondholders Lose from Junk Bond Covenant 
Changes?” by Marcel Kahan and Bruce Tuckman in Journal of Business 
(University of Chicago Press) October 1993, vol 66, p 499. (Neither this 
article nor that mentioned at para 30 above was cited to us; neither affects 
my reasoning or my conclusion, so I did not consider it necessary to invite 
submissions from counsel about either.)148 
                                                            
147 Azevedo v. Imcopa Importação, [2013] (Civ) 364, [31] (Eng.) (“We have to decide the 
point without the benefit of any previous English authority of direct relevance, other than the 
judge’s judgment in this very case . . . .”).  
148 Id. at [33]. 
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This reference is revealing in several ways. The court was intrigued or 
amused by the suggestively named yet obscure “Trembling Hand Perfect 
Nash Equilibrium.” Indeed, the whole paragraph is likely a judicial joke. 
But, most importantly, the parenthetical following the citation to Kahan and 
Tuckman implies that it would have been inappropriate to rely on academic 
literature that had not been cited to the court without inviting submissions 
from counsel.  
Here, again, we see the difference in style. No U.K. judge would think it 
inappropriate to cite an obscure case not cited to the court without inviting 
submissions from counsel, at least if the case is from a U.K. or 
Commonwealth court. But, an article on bonds published in a finance 
journal, co-authored by a law professor (Kahan) and a finance professor 
(Tuckman), was sufficiently foreign to be treated with care, even when 
referred to as a joke.  
CONCLUSION 
Bayless Manning’s classic article on shareholders’ appraisal remedy is a 
tribute to his late colleague Frank Coker.149 In the opening, he recalled that 
“[a] dean of my acquaintance is fond of saying that every law school course 
should be a course in jurisprudence.”150 He went on to note that Coker, in 
his fields of corporate law and contracts, “found the stuff of the cosmos. 
Every problem was a problem in depth; every class a class in 
jurisprudence.”151 Just as we humans discover that we speak in prose,152 we 
lawyers discover that we have a jurisprudence, whether we know it or not.  
Obvious to outsiders, but often invisible to natives, American lawyers 
have a very particular way of looking at the law, a perspective that we absorb 
with our first exposure to the law and that we enact in our daily practice. 
That American perspective, I have argued, is shaped by the American Legal 
Realists’ understanding of the nature of adjudication. With the Realists, we 
see widespread indeterminacy in the law. Whether it is pervasive overall or 
just characteristic of many of the most interesting cases is beside the point. 
We fully believe that the most interesting cases can be decided either way 
and that policy considerations, rather than the cases and the statutes, will 
often be determinative.  
                                                            
149 Bayless Manning, The Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE 
L.J. 223 (1962). 
150 Id. at 223.  
151 Id. at 225. 
152 See generally MOLIÈRE, THE BOURGEOIS GENTLEMAN (Bernard Sahlins ed., 2000). 
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This is our legacy from our teachers and our teachers’ teachers, and it is 
on full display even in a field as practical as corporate law. A comparison of 
Delaware and U.K. approaches suggests that the different jurisprudential 
traditions fundamentally shape the judicial style, the ways in which 
arguments are articulated.  
What I cannot discern is whether the differing jurisprudential 
approaches affect the outcomes. My strong sense is that, at least in 
corporate law, they do not. In both the Delaware and U.K. cases, the judges 
recognize the issues at stake and sufficiently understand the underlying 
institutional context and business realities to arrive at sensible conclusions. 
There is no evidence that the jurisprudence creates the sort of confusion—
the slavery of a priori categories and the curse of Platonic realities—that the 
Realists attributed to their bête noir, the “formalist.” In corporate law, both 
in Delaware and the United Kingdom, one sees good decisions and bad 
decisions. But, at least based on my reading, there is no reason to believe 
that judges trained in the realist tradition are more or less likely to reach 
good decisions than judges trained as doctrinalists. 
